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Introduction
How interest groups attempt to influence Congress has been 
a significant topic of inquiry since the early days of the 
political science profession (Herring, 1929). The majority of 
research in this area has investigated either lobbyists as indi-
viduals or the interest group clients that they represent 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). Despite this history, the field has 
only recently turned its focus to the business side of lobby-
ing (Drutman, 2015; LaPira and Thomas, 2017). Research 
has begun to examine not only the substance of what lobby-
ists do – such as how they choose their issue positions – but 
also how they sustain an economic enterprise.
Developing scholarship on the business of lobbying 
calls attention to “the presence of the lobbying industry as 
an intermediary” in the political process (Bertrand et al., 
2014: 3886). However, this progressing literature still gives 
only minimal attention to lobbying firms – the business 
organizations that are responsible for hiring and managing 
thousands of contract lobbyists. Some studies use data on 
lobbying firms (Bertrand et al., 2014; Blains i Vidal et al., 
2012), but this work seeks to explain the behavior of lobby-
ists as individuals rather than the firms that employ them.
This article argues that lobbying firms themselves are 
institutions with relatively stable partisan identities that 
make them relevant intermediaries between organized inter-
ests and legislators. Firms may have partisan ties that affect 
their revenue generation by helping to resolve uncertainty 
on the part of potential clients about how the firm is likely to 
perform its work. To understand this intermediation, this 
article tests a model of lobbying firm revenue. It evaluates 
the extent to which partisan ties between lobbying firms and 
the partisan leadership of Congress explains the ability of 
firms to raise lobbying revenues from their clients. In 
extending beyond previous studies that analyzed lobbying 
revenue as an individual-level phenomenon, the model 
incorporates firm partisan identities, as well as firm clientele 
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size, diversity, and other organizational characteristics. This 
analysis lays a foundation for appreciating how lobbying 
firms are political enterprises within the party system.
This article has three key findings. First, lobbying firms 
have identifiable and relatively stable partisan identities. 
Second, lobbying firm ties with the partisan leadership of 
the US House of Representatives are significantly associ-
ated with higher revenues for firms, approximately 
US$5000 to US$6000 per lobbyist per quarter. Third, 
change in the party controlling the House of Representatives 
is associated with revenue losses for firms tied to the party 
losing control, roughly US$40,000 per lobbyist for one 
year. Evidence regarding firms’ ties with the partisan lead-
ership of the Senate is mixed, with the presence of signifi-
cant effects depending on model specification.
A partisan theory of legislative subsidy
To appreciate why lobbying firms may benefit financially 
from their connections with political parties, we consider 
why legislators pay attention to lobbyists at all. Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) explained that legislators face perpetual 
shortages of time and staff resources to work on issues they 
care about. If lobbyists bring policy information, political 
intelligence, and legislative labor to issues that legislators are 
concerned with, then legislators may be able to devote more 
time to those issues than they otherwise would. Meeting with 
lobbyists expands a legislator’s time budget for working on 
an issue, thus subsidizing attention to that issue.
If legislators are to accept the information, intelligence, 
and labor provided by lobbyists, then they need to trust lob-
byists. For this reason, legislators are most likely to meet 
with lobbyists who are among their closest allies (Hojnacki 
and Kimball, 1998). During a period of high partisan polar-
ization – such as the contemporary era – allies are likely to 
be members of the same party (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000). 
Organizational identity is a key way that advocacy organi-
zations become known with respect to their political loyal-
ties (Heaney, 2004; Heaney and Leifeld, 2018). Thus, we 
argue that the partisan organizational identities of lobbying 
firms are important to them being understood as partisan 
allies to legislators.
Given the procedural advantages that accompany major-
ity status in Congress, outside interests are willing to pay 
more to have access to the majority than to have access to 
the minority (Cox and Magar, 1999). If lobbyists gain 
access to legislators by being allies – which usually requires 
being co-partisans – then sharing partisan identification 
with the party in control of a chamber should translate not 
only into more access but also into greater payments from 
clients for the access that is granted.
Based on these arguments, we state:
Hypothesis 1: Lobbying firms that have partisan ties to 
the majority party receive greater lobbying revenues 
than do lobbying firms that do not have such ties, other 
things equal.
The willingness of legislators to accept subsidies pro-
vided by lobbyists likely depends not only on partisan 
alignment but also on the degree to which they are already 
supported by staff. A legislator with an extensive staff may 
place less reliance on lobbyists than would a legislator with 
fewer staff resources. Given notable differences between 
members of the House and Senate in access to staff 
resources – with the Senate allocating more resources per 
member than the House – lobbying clients may be willing 
to pay differently for lobbying the chambers (LaPira and 
Thomas, 2017: 13). Thus, we state:
Hypothesis 2: Lobbying firms receive greater financial 
returns when they have partisan ties with the partisan 
majority of the House than when they have partisan ties 
with the partisan majority of the Senate, other things 
equal.
In addition to the partisan theory of legislative subsidy, 
there may be other reasons to expect differential returns 
from lobbying the two chambers. Baker (2008: 144–151) 
interviewed 12 lobbyists about their perceptions of differ-
ences in lobbying the House and Senate. His respondents 
perceived Senators as being harder to lobby than House 
members because they viewed Senators as more cross-pres-
sured by diverse constituencies, more concerned with broad 
national interests, and less attentive to the technical details 
of legislation. Thus, there may be reasons in addition to 
staffing disparities for differential lobbying returns between 
the chambers.
Organizational characteristics and 
lobbying firm revenue
Lobbying firms have organizational-level characteristics 
beyond their partisan identities that may affect their revenue 
stream. First, number of clients is important because larger 
firms are better known, more prestigious, and thus more 
capable of demanding higher payments for their services 
than are firms with fewer clients (Schiff et al., 2015). 
Second, client diversity with respect to issues and industries 
is important because of the long-standing expectation in 
economics that diversification spreads risk across invest-
ment portfolios (Markowitz, 1959). Third, firm organiza-
tional characteristics – such as whether a firm is a law firm, 
has international offices, the number of its domestic offices, 
and its age – may account for variations in prestige and 
economies of scale for client recruitment that may corre-
spond with how firms earn revenue. For example, a lobby-
ing firm that is also a law firm may assign its associates both 
legal and lobbying tasks, thus potentially reducing its lobby-
ing revenue per lobbyist (but increasing its legal revenue).
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Research design
We draw on lobbying reports that are available as a result of 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. We focus on 
reports filed from 2008 to 2016, after the passage of the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 
which changed the LDA reporting frequency from semi-
annually to quarterly and modified rules for lobbyist regis-
tration. We combine publicly available lobbying data with 
original research on the lobbying firms appearing in the 
records.
We modeled our dependent variable, Revenue per 
Lobbyist, in real dollars, which reflects the aggregate 
income each lobbying firm earned from all clients in a 
period. We adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (FRED, 2017).
Our focal independent variables are Firm Partisan 
Alignment with House Leadership and Firm Partisan 
Alignment with Senate Leadership. It is possible for a firm 
to be aligned with both the House and Senate, one or the 
other, or neither chamber. We did not consider bipartisan 
firms or those without clear partisan identifications to be 
aligned with either chamber.
We determined the partisan ties of a firm using cam-
paign contributions of its lobbyists. If a firm’s lobbyists 
gave a high percentage of their contributions to one party, 
then we considered the firm to be aligned with that party. In 
recognizing that the boundary between “partisan” and 
“bipartisan” firms may be fuzzy, we calculated partisanship 
using three different giving thresholds: 85%, 90%, and 
95%. Further, we calculated two versions of each of these 
measures. For the first version, each firm’s alignment was 
calculated once and fixed in time (based on lobbyists’ cam-
paign contributions dating to 1990), treating it as a rela-
tively stable characteristic. The second version allowed the 
firm’s identity to vary each year as a function of changes in 
its lobbying roster and campaign giving, treating it as a 
more fluid factor. Fleiss’s κ, a reliability measure for cate-
gorial variables, was 0.86 for the time-fixed measure and 
0.84 for the time-varying measure, indicating “substantial” 
to “nearly perfect” agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). 
The time-fixed and time-varying measures of partisan ties 
exhibit highly correlated partisan classifications (ranging 
from 0.62 to 0.63, p ⩽ 0.05), yielding strong evidence of 
relatively stable firm partisan identities.
We examined the validity of our measures by using data 
from firms’ web pages on the founders of lobbying firms. 
Firms were classified as Democratic if they had only 
Democratic founders, Republican if they had only 
Republican founders, and bipartisan if they had at least one 
founder from each party. We correlated these founder-based 
measures with the contribution-based measures discussed 
above. We found positive, statistically significant correla-
tions between firms having only Democratic founders and 
those making homogeneously Democratic contributions, or 
between having only Republican founders and those mak-
ing homogeneously Republican contributions (with corre-
lations ranging from 0.31 to 0.55, p ⩽ 0.05), supporting the 
conclusion that our measures are relatively stable and valid 
indicators of firm identity. Indeed, the influence of the 
founders is not ephemeral; it persists over time.
We calculated the Number of Clients and Client Diversity 
using LDA data. Data on Law Firms, International Offices, 
Number of Domestic Offices and Firm Age were drawn 
from lobbying firm websites. These web-based variables 
contain substantial missing data because not all lobbying 
firms have websites. Smaller, newer, and disbanded firms 
were especially at risk of not having a site.
Statistical analysis
We analyzed quarterly data reported by an unbalanced 
panel of 1603 lobbying firms from the first quarter of 2008 
through the third quarter of 2016. Registrants were taken 
from lobbying reports where the registrant and the client 
differed – indicating that the registrant was a contract lob-
byist or firm hired by a client. To count as a firm, a regis-
trant had to list two or more lobbyists as active in the same 
quarter at least once and have at least two quarters with 
nonzero dollars.
Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the distribution of partisan giving, from 
which we calculated partisan ties, based on firms with 
nonzero campaign giving (84% of firms). It exhibits a 
bimodal pattern, with partisan firms clustered at the 
extremes of the distribution. The time-fixed and time- 
varying distributions are similar. One notable difference 
between them is that the percentage of Democratically tied 
firms is greater when using the time-varying measure than 
when using time-fixed measure. This pattern indicates that 
fewer firms reliably give 95% or more of their contribu-
tions to Democrats than there are erstwhile Democratic 
firms that meet this threshold periodically. Either way, the 
distribution reveals a drop-off in partisan ties after the 
95% threshold. These findings indicate that roughly 42 to 
60% of firms have a “partisan” bent and 40 to 58% have a 
“bipartisan” orientation, depending on the selected cutoffs.
Figure 2 reports the average revenues over time for 
bipartisan, Democratic, Republican, and unclassified firms. 
We used the 90% partisan-giving threshold and the time-
fixed measure of partisanship for this graph. Bipartisan 
firms consistently earned greater average revenues than 
did their partisan-leaning competitors. Republican and 
Democratic firms were roughly at parity over time. 
However, a marginal advantage traded back and forth cor-
responding with congressional control. Democratic firms 
earned higher average revenues when Democrats held con-
gressional majorities from 2008 to 2010. Republican firms 
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earned more when Republicans reclaimed congressional 
control from 2011 through 2016. Unclassified firms earned 
consistently lower average revenues than did partisan and 
bipartisan firms.
We report variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
in Table 1.
Panel linear regression models
We estimated two sets of panel linear models. The first set 
was estimated on Revenue per Lobbyist as the dependent 
variable. Six versions were estimated to allow for time-
fixed and time-varying measures of Firm Aligned with 
House Leadership and Firm Aligned with Senate 
Leadership, as well as 85%, 90%, and 95% cutoffs for 
each.
We included control variables for Number of Clients and 
Client Diversity, neither of which contained missing data. 
Our remaining, time-invariant control variables (Law Firm, 
International Office, Number of Domestic Offices, and 
Firm Age) contained missing data. We applied multiple 
imputation to address this issue (King et al., 2001). 
Imputation procedures and diagnostics are reported in 
Online Appendix A. Panel linear models 1.1 through 1.6 
were estimated using random effects for firms and fixed 
effects for years (see Table 2). We employed HC3 Arellano 
standard errors (clustered by firm) that are robust to heter-
oskedasticity and serial autocorrelation (Arellano, 1987).
The results in Table 2 support Hypothesis 1 with respect 
to the House of Representatives. The coefficient on Partisan 
Alignment with House Leadership is significant in all six 
Figure 1. Distribution of partisan giving by lobbying firms.
Figure 2. Revenue trends lobbying firms, 2008–2016.
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models. The results indicate that firm partisan ties are worth 
approximately US$5000 to US$6000 per lobbyist per 
quarter, other factors held constant. Hypothesis 1 is only 
supported with respect to the Senate when firm partisan 
alignment is based on a time-fixed measure (in models 1.1, 
1.2, and 1.3). Hypothesis 2 is tested using a restricted 
hypothesis test that is supported only when firm partisan 
alignment is based on a time-varying measure (in models 
Table 1. Variable definitions and ddescriptive statistics.
Variable Minimum Mean Median Maximum Percent
 (SD) Missing
Revenue per Lobbyist per Quarter (dependent variable) US$776 US$74,007 US$54,365 US$913,800 0.00
 (US$71,481)  
Firm Partisan Alignment with House Leadership – 1 if firm  
 partisan identity matches House leadership; 0 otherwise  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 85% threshold 0 0.23 0 1 0.00
 (0.42)  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 90% threshold 0 0.19 0 1 0.00
 (0.39)  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 95% threshold 0 0.14 0 1 0.00
 (0.35)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 85% threshold 0 0.26 0 1 0.00
 (0.44)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 90% threshold 0 0.23 0 1 0.00
 (0.42)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 95% threshold 0 0.14 0 1 0.00
 (0.35)  
Firm Partisan Alignment with Senate Leadership – 1 if firm  
 partisan identity matches Senate leadership; 0 otherwise  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 85% threshold 0 0.26 0 1 0.00
 (0.44)  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 90% threshold 0 0.22 0 1 0.00
 (0.41)  
Time-Fixed Partisan Identities – 95% threshold 0 0.17 0 1 0.00
 (0.38)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 85% threshold 0 0.26 0 1 0.00
 (0.44)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 90% threshold 0 0.23 0 1 0.00
 (0.42)  
Time-Varying Partisan Identities – 95% threshold 0 0.21 0 1 0.00
 (0.40)  
Number of Clients 1 10.36 4 276 0.00
The unique number of entities a firm lobbied on behalf of (17.94)  
Client Diversity 2 9.25 6 77 0.00
Firm issue diversity and firm industry diversity are (9.28)  
 calculated separately using Simpson’s Reciprocal  
 Indexa and then added together  
Law Firm 0 0.26 0 1 34.42
1 if firm was a law firm in 2015; 0 otherwise (0.44)  
International Office 0 0.16 0 1 35.74
1 if firm had an international office in 2015; 0 otherwise (0.36)  
Number of Domestic Offices 1 3.41 1 83 33.48
The number of offices inside the United States (7.20)  
Firm Age 0 18.31 8 180 9.33
Observed year minus founding year (28.41)  
N = 33,243  
Note: aDiversity = [Σ[(ni/N)2]]-1, where ni is the total dollars reported with that industry or issue for the firm in a given quarter and N is all dollars 
reported by the firm in a quarter (Simpson, 1949).
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1.4, 1.5, and 1.6). Online Appendix B shows that these 
results are substantively the same as those obtained when 
using a fixed-effects specification. Online Appendix C 
indicates that support for Hypothesis 1 would be somewhat 
higher were we to consider the effects of multicollinearity 
on suppressing the significance of Senate effects. The con-
trol variables, Number of Clients and Client Diversity, are 
significant with positive coefficients, while our Law Firm 
control variable is significant with negative coefficients.
The second set of models was estimated on Change in 
Revenue per Lobbyist as the dependent variable. These first-
differences specifications use Change in each of the inde-
pendent variables. The advantage of estimating these models 
is that they remove residual unobserved heterogeneity 
(Greene, 2012: 356). They also remove time-invariant, firm-
level independent variables from the models (i.e., Law Firm, 
International Office, Number of Domestic Offices), since 
these variables have ΔX = 0 in all cases, as well as Firm 
Age, since ΔX = 1, yielding a constant. Consequently, vari-
ables containing missing data drop from the equations, elim-
inating the need for imputation. We followed the same 
procedures for estimating standard errors as in the first set of 
models.
The results of the first-differences analysis are in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported with respect to the House in five 
of the six models, with the coefficient falling just short of 
the conventional threshold of significance (p ≈ 0.07) in 
Model 2.5. Substantively, these results indicate that a change 
in firm alignment with the House is worth approximately 
US$1800 to US$5000 per lobbyist per quarter. We find no 
support for Hypothesis 1 with regard to the Senate in the 
second set of models. Hypothesis 2 is supported with respect 
to differences between the House and Senate in two of six 
models. For the control variables, Change in Number of 
Table 2. Firm revenue per lobbyist – panel linear models with firm random effects, temporal fixed-effects, and multiple imputation 
for missing data in firm attributes.
Model 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
 Time-Fixed Partisan Identities Time-Varying Partisan Identities
Partisan-giving threshold 85% 90% 95% 85% 90% 95%
 Coefficient
 (Standard error)
Independent variable  
Firm Partisan Alignment with House 5536 * 6527 * 6096 * 5148 * 5346 * 4940 *
 Leadership (1734) (1944) (2132) (1298) (1343) (1396)
Firm Partisan Alignment with Senate 3465 * 4624 * 4418 * 843 513 −267
 Leadership (1541) (1712) (1964) (1091) (1115) (1155)
Number of Clients 1658 * 1656 * 1660 * 1651 * 1654 * 1653 *
 (245) (245) (245) (246) (246) (246)
Client Diversity 1311 * 1306 * 1305 * 1317 * 1322 * 1323 *
 (320) (319) (320) (322) (321) (322)
Law Firm –5529 * –5578 * –5626 * –6138 * –6135 * –6172 *
 (1993) (1989) (1990) (2038) (2039) (2040)
International Office –1005 –908 –912 –319 –343 –344
 (2265) (2261) (2270) (2186) (2183) (2189)
Number of Domestic Offices –304 –311 –296 –320 –321 –315
 (193) (193) (193) (205) (205) (205)
Firm Age –45 –42 –43 –29 –28 –29
 (25) (25) (25) (23) (23) (23)
Constant 48,210 * 48,088 * 48,697 * 49,102 * 49,255 * 49,641 *
 (2860) (2822) (2813) (2752) (2753) (2748)
Model Statistic  
N 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243
Firms 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603
T 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35
F-statistic 4814 * 4846 * 4782 * 4815 * 4806 * 4760 *
F degrees of freedom 42, 33,200 42, 33,200 42, 33,200 42, 33,200 42, 33,200 42, 33,200
β1 = β2 Restricted hypothesis test F-statistic 4 3 1 20 * 23 * 24 *
β1 = β2 Test F degrees of freedom 1, 33,200 1, 33,200 1, 33,200 1, 33,200 1, 33,200 1, 33,200
Note: * p ⩽ 0.05.
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Clients is significant in five of six models, while Change in 
Client Diversity is not significant in any model. Robustness 
analysis in Online Appendix D shows that these results are 
not an artifact of multicollinearity. Online Appendix E 
shows that our results are substantively similar if we use the 
partisan identities of firms’ founders as our focal independ-
ent variable.
Difference-in-differences designs for party 
takeover “treatments”
In order to address questions of causation, we subjected the 
data to a harder test. If partisan efforts – or some other unob-
served endogenous process – caused partisan firms’ reve-
nues to increase, then it is not likely that they occurred 
immediately after a new majority took over. Starting new 
House-majority-party-aligned firms immediately after a 
takeover occurs would be costly. We think it is more plausi-
ble that any year-over-year changes in party-aligned firms’ 
revenues can be attributed to the immediately perceived 
value in an in-party-aligned firm. In Online Appendix F, we 
considered and ruled out the possibility that lobbyists 
switching to firms with different party loyalties in the after-
math of changing partisan control of a chamber is a signifi-
cant factor.
We addressed causation by exploiting exogenous changes 
in House and Senate party leadership as temporal interven-
tions. We used a kernel-weighted difference-in-differences 
estimator (Hazlett, 2019) to test temporal causality for 
changes in both institutions, which occurred as a result of 
separate electoral cycles. We exploited exogenous shocks 
created by changing control of the House in 2011 (from 
Democratic to Republican) and Senate in 2015 (from 
Democratic to Republican). Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012) and 
de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) recommended the differ-
ence-in-differences approach when dealing with panel data-
sets on lobbying because it effectively addresses persistence 
issues – the continuation of previous trends despite a chang-
ing state of the world, as may be induced when firms keep 
the same clients that they had the year before – that com-
monly affect this type of data (Buraimo et al., 2016).
We estimated the causal effect of a lobbying firm being 
tied to the party gaining control over a chamber of Congress. 
A firm was “treated” when its aligned party gained control 
of a chamber. These firms were compared to newly ousted-
party firms. We uncovered a positive treatment effect on 
Revenue per Lobbyist when the Tea Party movement helped 
Republicans regain of the House majority in 2011. Figure 3 
plots the values for the 2010–2011 takeover treatment 
effects. Lobbyists at Republican-aligned firms are esti-
mated to have gained just over US$10,000 for the year. 
Table 3. Change in revenue per lobbyist – panel linear models on first differences (i.e., ΔY on ΔX).
Model 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
 Time-Fixed Partisan Identities Time-Varying Partisan Identities
Partisan-giving threshold 85% 90% 95% 85% 90% 95%
 Coefficient
 (Standard error)
Independent variable  
Change in Firm Partisan Alignment with House 3520 * 3638 * 5048 * 1819 * 1741 2370 *
 Leadership (1475) (1641) (1849) (871) (952) (952)
Change in Firm Partisan Alignment with Senate 706 1915 2829 –787 –629 –585
 Leadership (1327) (1493) (1722) (772) (815) (812)
Change in Number of Clients 3119 * 3119 * 3119 * 3119 3119 * 3120 *
 (316) (316) (316) (315) (316) (316)
Change in Client Diversity –657 –657 –658 –658 –658 –659
 (395) (395) (395) (395) (395) (395)
Constant –171 * –170 * –164 * –178 * –178 * –177 *
 (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) (70)
Model statistic  
N 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243 33,243
Firms 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603
T 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35 2 to 35
F-statistic 381 * 381 * 382 * 381 * 380 * 381 *
F degrees of freedom 4, 31,635 4, 31,635 4, 31,635 4, 31,635 4, 31,635 4, 31,635
β1 = β2 Restricted hypothesis test F-statistic 2 1 1 4 * 3 4 *
β1 = β2 Test F degrees of freedom 1, 31,635 1, 31,635 1, 31,635 1, 31,635 1, 31,635 1, 31,635
Note: * p ⩽ 0.05.
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Ousted-Democratic lobbying firms are estimated to have 
lost more than US$40,000 in annual revenues, despite still 
holding the Senate majority. We observed no significant 
effects after the Republican Party’s takeover of the Senate 
in 2015, as we report in Figure 4. Additional information on 
the difference-in-differences estimation is in Online 
Appendix G.
Conclusion
Lobbying firms have relatively stable partisan identities 
that matter in their ability to attract revenue from interest 
group clients. Our measures of firm partisan identities are 
reliable, their validity is supported by their correlation with 
the partisan identities of firms’ founders, and scarcely few 
lobbyists leave a partisan firm from one party to work for a 
partisan firm of the opposite party. Partisan ties help to 
define lobbying firms as institutions.
Partisan ties between lobbying firms and the partisan 
leadership of the House of Representatives help to boost 
lobbying firm revenues, with 12 of 13 tests supporting this 
conclusion, including a difference-in-differences analysis. 
However, evidence of financial benefits from partisan ties 
with the partisan leadership of the Senate is more limited, 
with only 3 of 13 tests favoring this view (though this sup-
port would be somewhat higher if we considered the effects 
of multicollinearity in models 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6). There is 
some indication that ties to the House are more revenue-
enhancing than ties to the Senate, with 5 of 12 tests backing 
this expectation. Since the outcomes of the 2018 midterm 
congressional elections led to another switch in partisan 
control of the House (from Republican to Democrat), these 
events will present another opportunity to test these hypoth-
eses once the 2019 lobbying data become available.
Our analysis favors the view that partisan ties with the 
House are a more reliable source of revenue than are ties 
with the Senate. This difference may be attributed to how 
differences in congressional staffing by chamber affect the 
perceived value of lobbying by firms. Nonetheless, there 
may be viable alternative explanations rooted in the longer 
electoral cycle, supermajoritian rules, and higher member 
prominence in the Senate. Moosbrugger’s (2012) theory of 
institutional vulnerability may provide a fruitful starting 
point for parsing these explanations in future research.
Our findings extend beyond Bertrand et al. (2014: 3915) 
by demonstrating that partisan identities (and other organi-
zational characteristics) of firms matter, as opposed to only 
the partisan identities of individual lobbyists. Our finding 
that ties to the House leadership have greater reliability for 
revenues than do ties to the Senate leadership contrasts 
with Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012), which found a greater 
value of being connected to the leadership of the Senate 
than to the leadership of the House (see Cox and Magar, 
1999 for a related finding). Future research could explore 
interactions among lobbying firms, legislative subsidies, 
chamber leadership, campaign contributions, and fundrais-
ing to further extend our understanding of partisan lobby-
ing firms as political institutions.
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